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Abstract
Transportation authorities have consistently failed to employ economic incentives on
major roadways--i.e. time-of-day pricing or "congestion fees"--to internalize the costs of
congestion.  In principle at least, such tolls can easily be shown to increase social welfare by
making motorists pay something closer to the full social costs of their driving decisions.  In
addition, recent advances in electronics make it possible to implement such fees fairly cheaply
and non-intrusively.  While these same authorities generally understand and acknowledge the
case for using congestion fees, they also claim that their use is politically infeasible because
too many motorists would suffer large increases in commuting costs.  This is the puzzle: If
congestion tolls truly do advance social welfare, why is it so difficult to find a way to
implement them?  Two common explanations for this difficulty are the following: (i) The
public perceives, or politicians fear that they would perceive, such fees simply as tax
increases.  If so, they might be responsive to an explicit promise to return the money in some
way.  (ii) Motorists dislike congestion fees because they find them coercive, in that they often
have few if any practical alternatives to paying the fee.  If so, then a policy option that offers
motorists a choice of toll lanes and the more customary free lanes may be more attractive than
a policy that policy of tolls on all lanes.
We have completed a survey of Southern California residents designed to test these
hypotheses.  Unlike most opinion surveys on congestion pricing, our survey was quite explicit
about the fate of the collected revenues.  For example, we presented respondents with policies
that returned a substantial portion of the revenues to the public, either in the form of cash
(through reductions in sales taxes and vehicle registration fees or through income tax credits)
or in the form of coupons to be used for vehicle emissions equipment repair, transit, and the
like.  In the past, most surveys have not been explicit about the revenues, or they have stated
that revenue use was to be for improved highways, transit, or other public purposes.  We find
that a promise to offset the imposition of congestion fees by other taxes can result in a
7 percentage point increase in support for congestion pricing policies, and the restriction of
congestion pricing to a single lane on a freeway attracts from 9 to 17 percentage points of
additional support.
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OVERCOMING PUBLIC AVERSION TO CONGESTION PRICING
Winston Harrington, Alan J. Krupnick, and Anna Alberini*
INTRODUCTION
As motorists in the U.S. are only too aware, the nation's highways are becoming more
and more crowded every year, especially in metropolitan areas where most of us drive.  The
number of urban areas classified by the Texas Transportation Institute as congested rose from
10 to 18 during the 1980s, as the fraction of interstate highway mileage with traffic volumes
within 20 percent of capacity jumped by nearly 50 percent.  Average speeds on the freeways
in Los Angeles, the nation's most congested urban area, are a mere 31 miles per hour (see
MacKenzie, Dower, and Chen, 1992).
Congestion at this level imposes enormous costs on society.  The time delay costs
alone have recently been estimated to exceed $22 billion annually (Hanks and Lomax, 1991).
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1989) cites an estimate of annual national productivity
losses from congestion of $100 billion.  Moreover, congestion increases environmental costs.
Vehicular volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions, which are a major contributor to the
ambient ozone problems experienced in many urban areas, are higher at low speeds and
higher still in stop-and-go traffic.  The California Air Resources Board estimates that a vehicle
traveling 10 miles in 30 minutes will emit 2.5 times the running exhaust VOC emissions as
one traveling the same distance in 11 minutes (see Burmich, 1989).  Unless something is
done, congestion will only get worse: regional population is expected to grow by 7.5 million
in the next 20 years, with little prospect of a corresponding increase in freeway capacity
(SCAG, 1997).
Historically, the response to roadway congestion has been to build more roads, but
capacity expansion has not been a successful long-run strategy for congestion in the past, and
it is not likely to be successful in the future.  This is in spite of billions of dollars of road
building per year financed by federal gasoline taxes alone through the Highway Trust fund
and allocated by the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA).1  The
main reason for this lack of effectiveness is that capacity expansion does not get at, and in fact
exacerbates the basic "open access" problem of urban expressways.  Expressways are
overused largely because drivers to not pay the full cost of their use -- in particular, drivers do
not pay the time delay and environmental costs they impose on others.
Regulatory barriers also will limit road building.  The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 contain a provision requiring local transportation plans in the worst ozone nonattainment
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areas to be "in conformity with" local plans to attain air quality standards.  The Amendments
also require that these problem ozone areas reduce VOC emissions by 3 percent per year.
Transportation planners are looking increasingly to policies designed to reduce
driving, encourage carpools, and encourage mass transit, especially during rush hours.  One
oft-cited, but virtually untested, approach to urban traffic congestion is to require users to pay
for highway travel during peak periods by means of time-of-day pricing.  Electronic
collection devices are making this approach easy and inexpensive to implement, as few toll
booths are needed.  Several roads in the U.S. and in other countries now feature such
electronic tollways--called variously HOT lanes, or FAST lanes, which are either HOV lanes
permitting tolled single-occupancy vehicles (SOVs) or new toll roads running parallel to
existing highways.2  But the idea has been very slow to catch on.
Political unpopularity may be the most important stumbling block--it is difficult to
convince people that they should pay for something they once got for free.  Underlying this,
we believe, are two factors of paramount importance.  First, the collected fees are customarily
perceived as a deadweight loss, with no compensating perception of (or perhaps a disbelief
about) the congestion reductions and other benefits that could be provided by those fees.
Perhaps this opposition could be reduced if the congestion pricing proposal were coupled with
a plan to return some or all of the revenues to the public in the form of a cut in local sales or
other taxes, or for some purpose earmarked to help commuters.
Second, motorists are likely to resent the imposition of congestion fees on an existing
freeway or freeway system, where they are more or less locked into an existing pattern of
single-occupancy vehicle use with few if any viable commuting alternatives.  However, if
congestion pricing were implemented so as to leave motorists the option of continuing to use
unpriced roads, motorists may have less reason to feel coerced and may therefore find
congestion pricing more acceptable.  Indeed, the success of the HOT lanes built in Houston,
Orange County, and Toronto underscores this point.
In this paper we describe the results of a telephone survey designed to examine the
sensitivity of public support when the two issues described above are addressed directly.  The
survey was conducted in Southern California under the auspices of the REACH Task Force
(Reduce Emissions And Congestion on Highways), a consortium of local governments,
                                               
2 The best-known example of a successful congestion pricing program is the Area Licensing Scheme in
Singapore where vehicles that wish to enter the central business district during peak travel periods must purchase
a license (Watson and Holland, 1978).  Hong Kong set up a similar system in a fairly successful pilot program in
1985 but then failed to generate enough public support for full implementation of the program (Harrison, 1986;
Pretty, 1988).  More recent examples include SR91 in Southern California, a private road built on public land (in
the median of an existing freeway), "HOT lanes" on Interstate 15 in San Diego, and Route 407 in Toronto.
Recently, a toll road near Paris converted to peak-period tolls, and other countries--namely, Norway, Sweden,
and Great Britain--appear to be serious about using congestion pricing sometime in the near future.  See Harvey
(1993) for a summary of the experiences in Singapore, Hong Kong, and other areas of the world.  Up-to-date
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corporations and citizen groups in the region, coordinated by the Southern California Area
Governments (SCAG).  SCAG is the designated regional metropolitan planning organization.
The purpose of the survey was to estimate public support for a set of rather complex pricing
policies combining peak-period pricing on freeways with other devices which we hoped
would partially defuse the opposition to congestion pricing, and to find the determinants of
respondent support for those policies.  The surveys are unusually explicit about the fate of the
collected revenues, and in particular they include examination of policies that return a
substantial portion of the revenues to the public, either in the form of cash (through reductions
in sales taxes and vehicle registration fees or through income tax credits) or in the form of
coupons to be used for vehicle emissions equipment repair, transit, and the like.
The results of the survey suggest that the public will respond favorably to details of
congestion pricing proposals that address the issues of revenue redistribution and preserving
motorist choice.  A promise to return a portion of the revenues had a significant effect on the
level of support, improving it by about 7 percent.  The fraction of revenues returned did not
seem to affect the level of support, or at least no significant differences could be observed in
the sample.  A promise to return the revenues "in kind," by distributing coupons good for use
on a number of transportation-related services did not, on average, affect the level of support,
although there appeared to be a small positive effect of increasing the fraction of revenues
returned.  The largest increase in support was found for the two high-occupancy transit (HOT)
lane proposals.  The proposal to convert an existing freeway lane to a HOT lane increased
support by about 8 percent, while the proposal to build a new freeway lane for toll use
increased support by 17 percent.
CONGESTION FEES
There is a sizable economics literature examining the benefits of congestion pricing of
roadways.  Economic theory suggests that congestion fees are the most cost-effective way of
achieving a given level of highway use -- i.e., if we add up all the costs, including the costs of
inconvenience associated with restricting travel or finding alternative trip routes or modes, we
will find that no other rationing method will achieve the result at lower total cost.  Moreover,
if the fee achieves a level of use such that the benefit to the marginal user equals the marginal
cost imposed on other users, then that fee generates a socially efficient level of roadway use. 3
Whether such theoretical arguments carry the day is unclear.  Localities clearly covet
the revenues that congestion pricing can raise.  And the technological barriers to
implementation have fallen dramatically with the development of convenient and reliable
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metering/billing systems.4  But, it is the political resistance to the use of congestion tolls that
limits their use.  In 1976, the Urban Mass Transit Administration made available demonstration
grants to local and regional transportation authorities for the purpose of establishing congestion
fee demonstration programs, but there were no takers (Higgins, 1986).  As recently as 1991, the
ISTEA authorized $25 million per year for six years of implementation of congestion pricing
pilot projects.  The Department of Transportation received 16 proposals, only one of which was
funded (the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge project) and even it has faced local opposition.
Other approaches to rationing roadway use, most notably the use of "high-occupancy-vehicle"
(HOV) lanes, which are restricted to vehicles having two, three or four occupants, face
problems, but these approaches are in much greater use than congestion tolls.  The HOV
experience suggests that restricting access to freeways may be tolerated in general, but the
particular use of congestion fees for that purpose is not.
Thus policymakers are becoming increasingly interested in understanding the
conundrum: Why do people seem to prefer more costly policies, such as HOV lanes, for
achieving the same objective?  And finally, are there ways to establish congestion fees so that
the public supports them?  The fact is, of course, that economic efficiency alone has seldom
been the deciding factor in public decisions.  After examining the political obstacles to
congestion fees, Giuliano (1992) concludes that " . . . [I]t is unlikely that congestion pricing
will be implemented to any significant extent in the U.S." (p. 335)
Despite the generally positive net benefits, all congestion pricing policies create a
large class of net losers, even in theory.  In addition, Calfee and Winston (1995) argue that the
costs of congestion are not perceived as particularly severe by those who have to endure them.
Motorists who are particularly averse to congestion arrange their lives so they can avoid its
worst aspects. In addition, congestion pricing policies are often discussed as if the fee
revenues themselves were a deadweight loss rather than a source of benefits that can be used
to increase support.  As a result, it is often difficult for the public to see that it is getting
anything for the money.  Small (1992) emphasizes the importance of the fee revenues to the
net benefits, and outlines a scheme of public transit investments and tax reductions aimed at
achieving a broader distribution of net benefits.  While Small does not test empirically the
potential improvement in public acceptability that might be provided by his proposal, his
work does support the notion that the disposition of the fee revenues must be carefully
designed and successfully communicated to the public.
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The other main political obstacle identified by Giuliano is the lack of choices now
available to commuters.  While congestion pricing will encourage the development of
alternatives to private, single-occupancy vehicle use (such as carpools, transit expansion, or
some as yet unimagined market response by entrepreneurs), the promise of such development
may not be credible to current commuters, and will be a cold comfort even in the best of
circumstances, since virtually any supply response will take some time.  With only a Hobson's
choice of "pay the toll" or "don't commute," congestion pricing begins to feel like coercion.  It
may be difficult to imagine how congestion pricing could be implemented, while preserving
commuter choice, especially in a very transit-poor region such as Southern California.  One
possibility is to make only some lanes of the freeway toll lanes, leaving the rest as open-
access or, better still, to implement pricing only on added lanes.  If the priced lane is a new
lane, it cannot be perceived as taking away from consumers what is "rightfully" theirs.5
There is little empirical data indicating the degree of the additional public support such
a proposal would enjoy over a "pure" congestion pricing proposal, although there are a large
number of surveys of public attitudes towards congestion tolls.  For instance, CIC Research
(1995) administered a survey designed to estimate the elasticity of demand for use of the
Coronado Bridge in San Diego, while examining where revenues should be spent, whether
congestion-varying tolls are a good idea and what the rush hour toll should be.  However,
subjects were not asked if they would "support" such an idea on a ballot and were not queried
about either revenue recycling or HOT lanes.
Roper (1986) asked questions in a ballot format.  Only one question dealt with tolls for
commuting trips and the format was a choice among three travel options: use a free interstate,
an interstate toll road with a faster commuting time, or a local route with a very long commute
time.  Forty percent of those polled favored the toll option.  Here, again, the revenue recycling
and HOT lane ideas were not addressed.
Finally, J. Moore Methods, Inc. (1994) administered a survey that combined concerns
about air pollution with concerns about traffic congestion and then asked for opinions about
use and impact fees.  Complete revenue recycling was considered ("Would you support a use
and impact fee system if it would not result in any tax increase overall?"), and received
support from 75 percent of those polled.
SURVEY DESCRIPTION
The survey instrument used in this project was developed after extensive focus group
interviews with commuters in Southern California, including those living in the far suburbs
(e.g., Palmdale) and more close-in areas (Los Angeles).6  These focus groups were used to
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define commuter concerns with congestion fees, develop appropriate language to communicate
our ideas, and explore a variety of revenue recycling and other options for their appeal.7
The survey was designed to use a Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI)
protocol.  This protocol helped standardize the conduct of the survey and improve data
handling.  More importantly, it allowed the fees that a subject would pay as part of the
congestion fee program to be personalized, based on driving distances, number of riders, and
frequency of rush hour travel.
Survey Samples
The survey sample was a random sample of adults (age 18 or greater), stratified by
county in the 5-county SCAG region.  We screened out adults who reported that they did not
travel on the freeways during rush hour.  The excluded adults might be expected to be more
supportive of the fee policies, as they will not be paying into the system but are likely to
benefit from cleaner air, less congested freeways and the promised tax rebates.  After
adjusting for oversampling,8 the demographic properties of the sample resemble those of the
population of Southern California.  In total, 1,743 interviews were completed.  The
cooperation rate, defined as the quotient of the total completed interviews and the total viable
contacts who have the potential to pass through the screeners, was 22 percent.
The interview consisted of three parts.  In the first part the interviewer elicited from
the respondent some fairly detailed information about the respondent's commuting behavior,
including the number of rush-hour commutes per week, travel time and distance, travel mode,
etc.  This part of the survey generated useful information about commuting behavior, but its
main purpose was to enable the CATI program to estimate the weekly and annual fees that
would be paid by the respondent.  The second part of the survey asked a set of standard
demographic questions: age, marital status, education, family composition, work status and
income.  These variables, as well as those on driving characteristics and respondent beliefs
about a number of pertinent issues, were useful in explaining the observed voting patterns
elicited by the survey.
The third and most important part of the survey elicited opinions on several different
congestion fee policies.  All respondents had described to them a "base" policy, in which a fee
of 5 to 10 cents per mile (depending on current congestion levels) was to be levied on all
freeways in the region.  Respondents were told that, based on their reported commuting
behavior, the policy would cost them an estimated X dollars in congestion fees each week,
with the revenues to be used for a variety of transportation-related purposes.  They were also
given an estimate of the weekly time savings that would result from the policy.  Estimates of
congestion fees and time savings were based on individual survey responses, informed by a
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travel model of the Los Angeles region developed for SCAG by Wilbur Smith Associates
(1997).
Respondents were then asked whether they would support in a referendum the policy
described.  A follow-up question determined whether their support or opposition was
"definite" or "probable."
Throughout the survey it was necessary to convey to the respondent a great deal of
information about the congestion fees: information about the features of the basic plan, such
as the transponder technology, treatment of carpools, and uses of the revenues.  In order to
keep the respondent engaged in the interview process, we presented this information to
respondents in questions of the form, "Suppose X.  Would you be more or less likely to
support the fee policy?"9  In addition, we wanted to remind respondents of the different ways
that people might respond to the fees, such as rescheduling some of their trips or using transit.
We presented this information as a series of questions structured as: "Some people say that
congestion fees will cause people to do X. Do you think this will happen most of the time,
some of the time, or almost never?10
While the main function of these questions was to convey information to the
respondent, the answers are also available for analysis.  We found, however, that the
responses to the features of the plan are difficult to interpret.  For example, most of those
opposed to the base fee described themselves as "less likely" to support any given feature.
Such respondents were apparently choosing the most negative category to the question and
did not want the interviewer to get the impression that they might support any feature of it.
The responses to the "belief" questions appear to be more meaningful, and in general we
found that those who thought the congestion fees would be effective at changing behavior
were more likely to support the policy.
As shown in Figure 1, the sample was then split randomly into three groups of
approximately equal size, with each group getting a set of questions related to a variation of
the congestion fee policy.  The three policy alternatives examined are as follows:
(i)Congestion fees with tax reductions.  Respondents were told that a certain portion
of the fee revenues (25, 50 or 82 percent11) would be used to reduce other taxes,
such as sales tax or state gasoline taxes or DMV registration and license fees.
They were also given a dollar amount of the tax reduction.  For the purposes of
the survey these tax-reduction amounts were computed by taking 25, 50 or 82
percent of the respondent's estimated congestion fee payments, although of course
respondents were not informed of this.  A follow-up question asked whether
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    Figure 1. Congestion Fee Survey
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respondents would support the policy if the revenues were returned as a tax credit
on the state income tax.
(ii) Congestion fees with coupons.  Respondents were told that they would be given
coupons that could be used for a variety of transportation-related services,
including public or private transit, jitney services, vehicle emission equipment
repair, etc.  This is the COALESCE proposal, as applied to congestion fees.  The
face values of the coupons being offered were 25, 50 or 82 percent of the
respondent's estimated fee payments.
(iii) HOT lanes.  Respondents were asked if they would support a policy in which fees
would be charged only on the left-most lane of all freeways.  It was made clear
that this would mean a reduction in the number of lanes available for "free"
travel.  A separate question asked whether the respondent would support fees if
they were levied only on newly-constructed lanes.
SURVEY RESULTS
We begin with a discussion of the demographic and commuting characteristics of the
respondents, and the level of support for the base congestion pricing policy.  Then we examine
the support for the three specific alternative policy designs.
Table 1.  Demographic and Commuting Characteristics of Survey Samples
Los Angeles Orange Riverside San Bern. Ventura
Regional
mean
Sampling weights 13,610 4,147 4,806 3,947 2,595
Age of respondent 38.3 39.7 39.2 39.7 39.3 38.9
Years of schooling,
head of household
14.7 14.8 14.1 14.5 14.7 14.6
Percent Asian 8.1% 5.0% 3.0% 4.3% 4.9% 6.0%
Percent Black 11.9% 2.3% 3.5% 6.9% 3.5% 7.7%
Percent Hispanic 22.9% 14.9% 17.3% 19.1% 17.2% 19.8%
Percent White 56.3% 76.7% 74.8% 69.3% 73.9% 65.6%
Average household income $52,800 $64,600 $53,000 $50,500 $64,800 $55,300
Median daily commuting
distance (miles)
24 22 37.5 30 20
Median commuting time
(minutes)
50 45 57.5 57.5 40
Background Data
Table 1 provides some personal characteristics of the survey respondents.  The respondents
in each county in the five-county SCAG region are representative of county residents in their age,
education and race.  The county averages are reasonably similar to one another except that theHarrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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county of Los Angeles has considerably higher minority populations than the four suburban
counties.  County differences in median commuting behavior are more substantial.  As shown,
commuters living in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties experience much more onerous
commutes than residents of the other counties, a reflection perhaps of their position on the
outskirts of the metropolitan area.  However, Ventura County is even further removed from the
center of the Basin, its median commute is the shortest, suggesting a greater prevalence of local
employment among Ventura County residents.
The implications of the base congestion fee plan described above for survey respondents is
shown in Table 2.  As shown, despite the greater use of freeways in Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties, the median congestion fees are a fairly constant four or five dollars per week.  However
the distribution of fees varies considerably, with much larger tails in Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties, where the 75th percentile fee is $21 and 16 dollars per week, respectively.




Average commuting mileage (round-trip) 5 24 50
Average daily commuting time (min.) 10 50 95
Congestion fees per week ($) 0 4 12
Minutes saved per day 4 15 30
Implicit price of time saved ($/hr) 2.51 4.74 7.31
Orange
Average commuting mileage (round-trip) 7 22 45
Average daily commuting time (min.) 10 45 86
Congestion fees per week ($) 0 4 10
Minutes saved per day 5 13 27
Implicit price of time saved ($/hr) 2.27 4.94 6.91
Riverside
Average commuting mileage (round-trip) 10 37.5 80
Average daily commuting time (min.) 15 57.5 120
Congestion fees per week ($) 0 5 21.5
Minutes saved per day 5 23 50
Implicit price of time saved ($/hr) 2.42 5.75 7.92
San Bernardino
Average commuting mileage (round-trip) 7 30 70
Average daily commuting time (min.) 20 57.5 118.5
Congestion fees per week ($) 0 4 16
Minutes saved per day 3 20 35
Implicit price of time saved ($/hr) 2.3 5.14 8.46
Ventura
Average commuting mileage (round-trip) 6 20 50
Average daily commuting time (min.) 11.25 40 80
Congestion fees per week ($) 0 4 10
Minutes saved per day 5 15 30
Implicit price of time saved ($/hr) 2.57 5.04 6.89Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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Support for the Base Congestion Fee
As shown in Table 3, a solid majority (56 percent) opposes the base congestion fee
policy, with only 38 percent in favor.  If we consider the intensity of preferences, we see that
a much higher fraction of the opposers are "definites," suggesting that this policy enjoys soft
support and faces hard opposition.
Table 3.  Support for Base Congestion Fee Policy
Support Oppose Don't Know
38% 56% 6%
Definite Probable Probable Definite
15% 23% 17% 40% 6%
The most common reason given for opposing the base policy is that it is nothing but
another tax (Table 4).  Fully a quarter of all respondents gave this as their reason for
opposition.  Another ten percent felt the time savings were not worth the estimated cost, and
eight percent were skeptical about its ability to reduce congestion.  About twelve percent cited
unfairness to low-income people or those with long commutes.
Table 4.  Reasons Given for Opposition to the Base Policy
(percent)
No reason given, respondent just doesn't like idea 14.7
Doesn't understand the program 1.4
Too big a change, too sudden 1.8
Reported time savings not worth the reported cost 10.5
Just a tax increase 26.5
Spillover effects on other roads 1.3
Not fair to low-income people 4.5
Not fair to people with long commutes 8.8
Suspicious of electronics 4.2
Unaffordable in my household 7.1
Policy wouldn't effectively reduce congestion 8.3
This fee would be okay for me but would hurt other household members 1.4
Other 6.5
(Don't know/NA) 3.1
Total 100.0Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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The proportion of respondents favoring the plan does not vary much from one county
to another.  As shown in Table 5, residents of Los Angeles County are slightly more likely,
and those of Ventura slightly less likely than residents in the other counties to support the
base policy.  Only the difference between Los Angeles and Ventura is statistically significant
(at the 5 percent level).
Table 5.  Support for the Base Policy by County
County Support Oppose Don't know
Los Angeles 39 55 5
Orange 36 60 4
Riverside 36 57 7
San Bernardino 37 57 6
Ventura 32 63 5
Explaining Base Fee Support
A large number of variables can be reasonably supposed to affect support for the base
policy.  To isolate the influences on support, we estimate a set of probit regression equations.
The estimated dependent variable in these equations can be interpreted as the probability that
an individual with the given characteristics will support the policy.  The independent variables
include (i) sociodemographic variables indicating gender, age, education income and ethnic
identification; (ii) respondent's commuting habits, including travel time and distance during
commutes, use of transit or carpools; and (iii) personalized impacts of the congestion fee
proposal on the respondent.  The coefficients on the independent variables indicate their
influence on the probability of support.
Four different regression specifications were examined, and results are shown in
Table 6.  After specification I we drop income, because its effect is small and it has an
adverse effect on sample size.  In specification II and III we split the time-saved variable into
two parts, as explained below.  Finally in specification IV we add a variable indicating the
respondent's belief in the efficacy of congestion fees.  As shown, this variable is quite
significant, but it is also to some extent jointly determined with support for the policy.  A
more useful model would perhaps explain belief in efficacy and support jointly, but there
were no variables that we could use to identify either.
Evidently, few of the independent variables do a very good job of explaining support
or opposition to congestion fees.  Several variables are almost statistically significant at
conventional levels, or are significant in some specifications but not others.  Their effects are
not robust; that is, their coefficients are strongly affected by the presence or absence of other
variables in the equation or by slight changes in the sample due to missing values.Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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Table 6.  Regression Results:  Base Congestion Fee Policy




































































































































































Mean Log Likelihood -.635 -0.632 -0.631 -0.573
N 978 1157 1157 1123Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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There are some surprises in these regression results, especially with respect to the
demographic variables.  It would have been reasonable to expect, for example, that
respondents with higher incomes would have supported congestion fees, because they would
tend to value the time savings more.  Likewise, we expected that more educated respondents
would be more likely to be able to assimilate the information provided during the survey and
better understand the arguments in favor of user fees, and therefore would be more likely to
support the policy than those less well-educated.  In the event, we found no income effect at
all and education was negatively associated with support.  Perhaps more educated respondents
were more skeptical of an untested economic theory or the competence of governments to
implement these ambitious plans.  The strongest result among the demographic variables was
the very strong support for the policy among Hispanic respondents.  Again, we have no
explanation for this result.
Among the commuting behavior variables, only the carpool and transit use variables
affected support, and only weakly.  Certainly individuals with more days in carpools or in
transit will benefit more from congestion fees and will be more likely to support them, but we
found only weak support for this hypothesis.  This result may be a consequence of the small
number of transit and carpool users in the sample; average transit and carpool use was only
0.12 and 0.56 days per week.  One may need a larger sample of transit users or carpoolers to
be able to discern an effect.
Neither trip length nor duration nor the number of commutes per week had any effect,
but we had no a priori expectations about those variables.  On the one hand, more rush hours
should mean more time savings from congestion fees, but on the other hand require greater
congestion fee payments.  Similar considerations apply to the trip distance.
The variables of greatest interest are those that correspond to the individual costs and
benefits of congestion pricing policy: minutes saved and estimated cost per hour saved.  The
cost per hour saved is calculated by taking the respondent's estimated congestion fee
payments per week and dividing by the estimated time savings attributable to the fee policy,
both quantities being determined by the CATI program.  It is simply the unit price of time
savings to the individual.  Indeed, we find that an increase in the unit price causes support for
the policy to decline.
We also find that support declines as the "minutes saved" variable increases, a result
that at first glance appears counter-intuitive.  Because the unit price is included in the
regression, however, this result is actually consistent with a downward-sloping demand curve
for time savings.  That is, motorists have a lower willingness to pay as the savings increases,
and as time savings increases the probability of support will drop as willingness to pay
becomes less and less likely to exceed the price per unit of time.  The effect is small but not
negligible; at time savings of 100 minutes per week (about the average for the sample), the
probability of support drops by about three percentage points.
There is no reason to expect this effect to be linear, and in fact we might expect the
level of support to be more sensitive to the minutes-saved variable when the quantity, and
hence the payment required, is large.  That is what we find.  In Columns III and IV ofHarrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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Table II-6 we allow the effect of this variable to be different for savings below one hour per
week and above one hour per week.  As shown, increasing minutes saved if anything
increases support up to savings of about an hour per week, after which point it drops.
In the final specification we add as a variable the respondent's view as to whether
congestion pricing would cause travel to move faster.  This was by far the most potent
variable increasing support, although other "belief" variables also were strongly associated
with the policy.  This leads to the tentative conclusion that an effective campaign to educate
the public on the benefits of congestion pricing may produce dividends.  In addition, support
may increase as word spreads about the experience with pricing experiments such as SR91.
Support for Policy Enhancements
As explained above, after eliciting the respondent's opinion about the base policy we
split the sample and inquired about the three enhancements to the policy.  Our main interest is
to determine by how much each enhancement adds to the base level of support and whether the
change in support is significant.  The estimation and related test of hypotheses is complicated
by the fact that we ask each respondent about both the base policy and about one alternative,
and the responses to these two questions are likely to be highly correlated.  Indeed, it is clear
that the respondent's attitude toward the base congestion fee is by far the best predictor of his
response to the other policies.  This point can be illustrated by the data in Table 7, a cross-
tabulation of support for the base policy and the combined congestion fee/tax reduction.
Table 7.  Importance of Base Policy
Support congestion fees with tax reductions?
Support base policy? Œ No Yes Don't know
No 74% 20% 6%
Yes 10% 88% 2%




The rows of Table 7 can be thought of as the conditional support for the fees with tax
reductions given their support or opposition to the base policy.  Thus, among opponents of the
base policy, 74 percent oppose the fees combined with tax reductions.  An even higher percentage
of base fee supporters--88 percent--support fees with tax reductions.  The fact that 20 percent of
base fee opponents change their vote, compared to only 10 percent of supporters, is the reason
that support for the fees with tax reductions is higher than support for the base policy.
To address the likely correlation between support for the base policy and for the policy
with rebates, we estimate a system of bivariate probit equations.  This system assumes that
support for each of the policy variants is driven by an underlying, and unobserved, normallyHarrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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Table 8.  Support for Congestion Fees with Tax Rebates:
Two specifications
Base Policy Tax Rebate Difference p-value
P y ( ) 1 1 = Extent of rebate P y ( ) 2 1 =
0.43 25 percent 0.50 0.07 0.0
50 percent 0.54 0.11 0.0
82 percent 0.48 0.05 0.006
Base Policy Tax Rebate
P y ( ) 1 1 = Amount of net
cong. fee
P y ( ) 2 1 =










Table 9.  Support for Congestion Fees with Coupon Rebates
Two Specifications
Base Policy Coupon distribution Difference p-value
P y ( ) 1 1 = Extent of rebate P y ( ) 2 1 =
0.37 25 percent 0.33 -0.04 0.98
50 percent 0.36 -0.01 0.60
82 percent 0.40 0.03 0.014
Base Policy Coupon distribution
P y ( ) 1 1 = Amount of net
cong. Fee
P y ( ) 2 1 =









0.33 -0.04 0.998Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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Table 10.  Support for HOT Lanes on Existing Freeways
Base Policy HOT lane
(existing lane)
Difference p-value
P y ( ) 1 1 = P y ( ) 2 1 =
0.37 0.46 0.09 0.0
Base Policy HOT lane
(new lane)
P y ( ) 1 1 = P y ( ) 2 1 =
0.37 0.54 0.17 0.0
Turning specifically to Table 8, it is clear from both specifications that the tax rebate
enhancement offers the prospect of increasing support by a modestly respectable amount,
from 43 to 50, 54 and 48 percent, as the total amount rebated increases from 25 to 82 percent
of the revenues.  Each of these support levels is significantly higher than that of the base
level,14 although they are not significantly different from each other.  When we look at the
effect of the individualized net rebate (the bottom half of Table 8), we see that support is
highest when the net fee is negative, but there is again no significant difference in response
among the different net fee categories.
The bivariate probit routine also reveals that the correlation between the unobserved
variables measuring support is quite high.  Specifically, the correlation coefficient is equal to
approximately 0.88 for both specifications of the model explaining support for the base policy
and congestion fees with tax rebates.  This suggests that the unobserved factors that lead an
individual to be in support of the base policy are also very important in predicting his or her
support for the tax rebate variant of the policy.  Furthermore, what is important is not the
absolute level of support for each of the policy enhancements but the increment over the
support for the base policy.
The patterns of support for the coupon enhancements (Table 9) are, in contrast, not
easy to explain.  First, we find that the support for congestion fees coupled with a refund of
25 percent of the revenue unaccountably reduces the level of support.  Even more puzzling,
the relation between the individualized net coupon rebate and the support is the reverse from
what one would expect.  As shown in the bottom part of the table, the more coupons received
relative to the average congestion fee, the less likely is the individual to support the policy.
Perhaps individuals perceive the coupons to have little value to them if they must be used for
transit and other alternative transportation.  Individuals may have failed to realize that a
coupon system would likely stimulate alternatives to private driving, and may have based
                                               
14 The hypothesis tested in Table 8 is that the support for the policy enhancement (in this case, the tax rebate) is
greater than the support for the base policy, against the null hypothesis that support is the same for both.Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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their responses on the present (and limited) availability of public transportation in Southern
California.  As an alternative explanation, perhaps this result stems from the inability of the
survey instrument to make the policy understood to the respondent.  Notably, the correlation
coefficient between the underlying support variable remains positive and high (0.87).
For the HOT lane enhancements the bivariate probit model is similar, but all
respondents are presented with the same policy, and only a constant term is included in the
right-hand of the equation explaining support for this policy variant.
When we turn to the HOT lane policies, designed to give commuters a choice between
free lanes and toll lanes, we find the largest increases in support (Table 10).  A policy the
converts an existing lane to tolls attracts 9 percentage points more support than the base
congestion fee policy, which imposes tolls on all lanes.  A policy of building a new toll lane
increases support over the base policy by 17 percentage points.  Assuming base support of 39
percent, the estimated support in the population of the South Coast, this is the only policy
commanding a majority of support.  It is also interesting to note that the correlation
coefficient between the unobserved variables denoting support is here somewhat lower--only
0.65 in the first specification (top panel) and 0.51 in the second specification (bottom panel).
CONCLUSION
Public aversion to congestion pricing is well-accepted among transportation planners
and policymakers.  As in most things, however, details matter.  We find that the level of
support for congestion pricing among survey respondents is sensitive to these details, which
were designed to deal with prominent objections to congestion pricing.  In particular,
informing respondents that some portion of the revenues would be returned in the form of
reductions in other local taxes increased the support for congestion fees by 5 to 10 percentage
points.  However, when the rebates are made not in cash but in kind, namely in the form of
coupons for subsidized, privately provided transit, the level of support is no better than the
base congestion fee policy.
It is no accident that the greatest increment in support over the base policy occurs for
policies that involve new construction and do not in any way reduce the open-access
resources available.  This outcome is consistent with the continuing political opposition to
congestion pricing, as well as the recent successes in gaining acceptance of new HOT lane
proposals and also the opening of a new freeway devoted to time-of-day pricing in Toronto.Harrington, Krupnick, and Alberini RFF 98-27
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